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Introduction
In industrial and developed countries, the 
restructuring of public sector increased the 
importance of fi scal decentralization in the 
second half of 20th century. In Eastern Europe 
its implementation delayed to the 1990´s. The 
decentralization of decision-making powers 
was supported by the fi scal federalism theory 
in the 1950´s and 1960´s (Oates, 2005) 
developed by Samuelson (1954; 1955), Tiebout 
(1956), Musgrave (1959). In this period many 
famous authors as Olson, Buchanan, etc. 
published their ideas in the fi eld of collective 
action (Zabkowicz, 2017). Famous is also the 
decentralization theorem formalized by Oates 
(1972) and the Leviathan hypothesis elaborated 
by Brennan and Buchanan (1980).
According to the Panizza (1999), World 
Bank (2001), Afonso and Hauptmeier (2009), 
Martinez-Vazquez and Canavire-Bacarreza 
(2012), Horváthová et al. (2012), and many other 
interested in the fi scal decentralization research, 
expenditure and revenue decentralization 
indicators are frequently used. However, tax 
decentralization and transfer dependence 
indicators suggested by Stegarescu (2004) 
or OECD eliminate their formality. Stegarescu 
(2005) uses measures based on tax autonomy 
and revenue decentralization to conduct 
revenue-based assessment of public sector 
decentralization, while according to Rodríguez-
Pose and Krøijer (2009, p. 15), transfers 
can in effect create negative incentives for 
subnational governments to mobilize own 
revenue. Aristovnik (2012) computes a fi scal 
decentralization index based on measuring the 
fi scal autonomy and fi scal importance of the 
local level of government.
According to the relevant literature, fi scal 
decentralization might be determined by several 
variables. Generally, according to Wagner´s 
Law (Wagner, 1876), the GDP growth is 
connected with demand for public expenditures 
leading to expansion and decentralization 
of the public sector. This expectation was 
supported by Bodman et al. (2009) with the 
exception of low-income countries, Martinez-
Vazquez and Canavire-Bacarreza (2012), 
Blume and Voigt (2008) or Panizza (1999). 
The relation of the unemployment rate to fi scal 
decentralization is investigated in Stegarescu 
(2004) considering declining revenue of the 
central government from taxes and social 
contributions in time of rising unemployment 
(case of revenue decentralization). Similarly 
behaves the dependency ratio. Bodman et al. 
(2009) satisfi ed their expectations about the 
negative infl uence of economic openness on 
fi scal decentralization, contrary to Stegarescu 
(2004). According to Bodman et al. (2009) the 
population density has no clear effect on fi scal 
decentralization, but its signifi cant presence 
in estimation is obvious. Blume and Voigt 
(2008) investigated for the correlation between 
fi scal decentralization and total government 
expenditure (negative correlation). In case of 
Bodman et al. (2009), the total government´s 
revenue expected positive effect is not obtained 
in case of expenditure decentralization. 
Assumptions about the infl ation rate and 
public debt relation to fi scal decentralization 
follow the need of centrally provided decisions 
on macroeconomic level as mentions Oates 
(2005). In period of their increase, the future 
development of economy might worsen 
(Siničáková et al., 2017; Siničáková & Gavurová, 
2017), so the decision-making burden is taken 
to the central level of government ruling against 
decentralization. Expectations about local 
indebtedness relation to fi scal decentralization 
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might postulate both effects. Positive, if the 
increase of local debt is connected with higher 
local authority (power to borrow). Negative one 
relies to need of local debt regulation on the 
central level in case of it extension what tends 
to reducing the power of localities. Finally, the 
area variable is investigated in Panizza (1999), 
Bodman et al. (2009) or Jílek (2015) without 
fi nding unanimous results supporting the idea 
of higher decentralization in large countries.
The aim of the paper is to investigate the 
fi scal decentralization determinants of the 
EU 28 countries analysing the period 1995-
2015. The fi rst chapter is focusing on related 
literature. It is followed by the chapter of 
methods and data. The third chapter presents 
obtained results and corresponding discussion. 
On the end, the conclusion and references are 
closing the paper.
1. Literature Review
According to Panizza (1999, p. 98), there 
exist some empirical regularities which explain 
differences in the level of fi scal centralization 
(and decentralization) among countries – 
fi scal centralization (and decentralization) 
determinants. Bodman et al. (2009) defi ne 
the fi scal decentralization as the amount of 
independent decision-making power involved 
in subnational provision of public services, 
expenditure and revenue decision in an 
economy. In their research, they investigate 
determinants of fi scal decentralization in a large 
sample of countries with a sub-sample of OECD 
countries and low income and high-income 
countries using various measures of fi scal 
decentralization. Their fi ndings in the panel data 
analysis are about the ambiguity where signs 
of variables for different fi scal decentralization 
measures are differing. Martinez-Vazquez 
and Canavire-Bacarreza (2012) stressed 
the infl uence of the geography on the fi scal 
decentralization. Their work is based on the 
idea that geographically diverse countries show 
greater heterogeneity among their citizens, 
including their preferences and needs for public 
goods and services provision what requires 
the decentralized decision-making. Panizza´s 
(1999) approach differs from other researchers. 
His interest focuses on fi scal centralization and 
investigates the impact of country size, ethnic 
fragmentation, and democracy. Despite the 
opposite approach, results essentially do not 
differ from those of others. Stegarescu (2004) 
analyses the vertical government structure. 
He is searching for the impact of economic 
integration on fi scal decentralization in OECD 
countries using the panel data. The indisputable 
contribution of Stegarescu (2005) remains 
on the fi scal decentralization measurement 
claiming the importance of own revenues 
especially tax revenues of lower government 
levels using the tax classifi cation suggested 
by OECD expressing the degree of the local 
government tax power.
Fiscal decentralization includes the 
decentralization of the tax power. Decisions in 
the fi eld of taxation made by governments on 
different levels of government might lead to tax 
competition. The problem of tax competition 
is elaborated in a huge body of literature. The 
implausible impact of tax competition among 
localities was described in Oates (1972). It 
prevents localities from providing an effi cient 
level of public good. Localities while vying for 
the mobile tax base decrease tax rates in sense 
of beggar-thy-neighbour competition (Jha, 
2015). This leads to drop-out in tax revenues, 
total local revenues and fi nally to cuts in the 
expenditure side of local budgets. In this way, 
the under- provisioning of the local good comes 
and the described reality is known as a race-
to-the-bottom hypothesis (see e.g. Razin & 
Sadka, 2011; Stansel, 2006 or Mendoza & 
Tesar, 2005). Lachet-Touya (2016) describes 
both vertical and horizontal tax competition in 
a common agency game. Gonzales-Eiras and 
Niepelt (2016) propose tax centralization and 
intergovernmental grants contrary to fi scal 
decentralization principles given by Oates 
(1999). Other forms of competition at the local 
government level regarding the Tiebout´s idea 
are investigated in Blazquez-Fernández et al. 
(2017). Here the quality of public good provided 
by lower government units causes the cross-
border mobility. 
Wide literature is focusing on investigating 
the impact of fi scal decentralization on chosen 
macroeconomic indicators. In the spirit of 
the Brennan and Buchanan´s Leviathan 
hypothesis, further research consists in 
“searching for Leviathan”. Marlow (1988), 
Oates (1985; 1989), Rodden (2003) or Crowley 
and Sobel (2011) are searching for constraining 
effect of fi scal decentralization on the 
government expenditure with different results. 
Often solved is also a question about the fi scal 
decentralization impact on public debt of EU 
EM_2_2018.indd   158 22.6.2018   9:17:33
1592, XXI, 2018
Finance
countries as provides Horváthová et al. (2012) 
or Afonso and Hauptmeier (2009). Results show 
the positive impact of revenue decentralization 
on public debt in the research of Horváthová 
et al. (2012) and the negative impact of the 
expenditure decentralization on a primary 
balance in case of Afonso and Hauptmeier 
(2009). Research focusing on investigating the 
relationship between fi scal decentralization and 
economic growth covers studies of Rodriguez-
Pose and Krøijer (2009) or Rodriguez-Pose 
and Ezcurra (2011). Analysis of this problem 
in countries of Central and Eastern Europe, 
and in OECD countries resulted in revealing 
the signifi cant negative impact of fi scal 
decentralization on economic performance, 
what interrupts the highlighted positive image of 
fi scal decentralization. Earlier, Akai et al. (2004) 
observed a positive relationship, and Akai et al. 
(2007) observed a hump-shaped relationship 
between fi scal decentralization and economic 
growth similarly to the Thießen (2003).
2. Methods and Data
Paper divides EU countries into more 
homogenous groups using the cluster analysis 
to reduce the diversity among countries 
regarding the rate of fi scal decentralization. 
Classifi cation of countries according to the 
degree (or rate) of fi scal decentralization is also 
proposed by Akai et al. (2004). Clustering, as 
a type of data segmentation, allows creating 
groups with the most possible similarity inside 
the group and the possible distance among 
groups (Řezánková et al., 2009). EU countries 
are divided according to hierarchical clustering 
based on Euclidean distance and Ward 
method. Decomposition into clusters serves 
as input to the regression analysis based on 
panel data approach and diminishes the inter-
country heterogeneity in the level of fi scal 
decentralization. This facilitates to reduce the 
possibility of omitting certain specifi cs.
Longitudinal data cover period from 1995 to 
2015 on annual base (with some exceptions of 
countries without complete datasets as Croatia). 
The paper follows the panel data approach 
based on estimating the most frequently 
used models for panels (longitudinal or cross-
sectional time-series data). The adequacy of 
pooled OLS, fi xed-effects (FEM) and random-
effects model (REM) is tested. First, for each 
cluster and each fi scal decentralization indicator, 
the pooled OLS models are estimated, and 
they are tested against the adequacy of FEM 
or REM. Panel diagnostic refers the adequacy 
of the pooled OLS or FEM and REM (Greene, 
2011). The Hausman test is used to decide 
between FEM and REM model (Baltagi, 2001). 
If the null hypothesis that GLS estimates are 
consistent is rejected, FEM model is estimated. 
To avoid heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, 
the robust HAC standard errors of Arellano type 
(Arellano & Bond, 1991) was introduced in case 
of FEM models. REM models are arranged 
using the Swamy-Arora transformation. All 
further presented models are parsimonious. 
For each cluster were estimated four models 
regarding the way of fi scal decentralization 
indicator expression.
Prepared dataset includes data from Eurostat 
and AMECO. Data are analysed through the 
econometric program R 3.2.3 and program Gretl. 
Fiscal decentralization measures (see Tab. 1) 
are expressing the fi scal decentralization rate 
or degree of fi scal decentralization and have 
two roles in the research. Their averages 
create basics of clustering. Time series of 
expenditure decentralization (ExpDec), revenue 
decentralization (RevDec), tax decentralization 
(TaxDec) and grant decentralization (GrantDec) 
are dependent variables in panel estimations.
To identify the fi scal decentralization 
determinants macroeconomic, demographic or 
geographic and fi scal indicators are involved to 
the econometric analysis:
Measure Expression
ExpDec Sub-national expenditure to total government expenditure
RevDec Sub-national revenue to total government revenue
TaxDec Sub-national tax revenue to sub-national total revenue 
GrantDec Sub-national grants and transfers received to total sub-national revenues
Source: own based on World Bank (2001)
Tab. 1: Fiscal decentralization measures
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Macroeconomic indicators are:
 GDP per capita growth (GDPpcgrowth),
 Economy openness (openessGDP) 
computed as a sum of Import and Export 
as % of GDP,
 Infl ation rate based on the HICP index 
(infl HICP),
 Unemployment rate (unmp),
 Public debt as % of GDP (PubDebtGDP).
Fiscal variables based on budget approach 
are:
 Total government revenues as % of GDP 
(TotRevGDP),
 Local indebtedness as % of GDP 
(LocDebtGDP).
Demographic and geographic variables 
involved to the research are:
 Population density (popdensity).
 Dependency ratio (dependencyratio) is 
computed as the share of the population 
less than 15 years and 65 years over on 
population in productive age.
 Area (area) in km2.
Research on fi scal decentralization 
determinants often stresses also other variables. 
According to the countries´ sample and results 
of preliminary estimations, they are not involved 
to the further investigation. Panizza (1999) or 
Aristovnik (2012) introduced the democracy 
indicator to explain the variability fi scal 
decentralization. Maličká (2016) proceeded 
similarly without fi nding its signifi cance on the 
European countries sample. The democracy 
degree of the EU country sample does not show 
any important dissimilarity among countries 
and is on a comparable level. Horváthová et al. 
(2012) or Bodman et al. (2009) deliberate over 
the constitution variable importance (federation, 
number of government levels, average size of 
local unit) expressing the origin of country´s 
administrative structure determining conditions 
for fi scal decentralization implementation with 
ambiguous answers. Afonso and Hauptmeier 
(2009) searched for the importance of the 
elections variable without fi nding its signifi cant 
infl uence. Stegarescu (2004) introduces dummy 
variables for second chamber of parliament 
with representatives delegated by the regions 
or a dummy variable for legal provisions 
concerning national and legislative referendums. 
Stegarescu (2004), Panizza (1999) or Martinez-
Vazquez and Canavire-Bacarreza (2012) 
involve to the research of fi scal decentralization 
(Panizza centralization) determinants indicators 
describing the linguistic or ethnic fragmentation. 
Excluding some exceptions (Belgium) the EU 
countries sample is not extensively ethnically 
and linguistically differentiated within country 
reviewing offi cial languages and nations. 
Extending the country sample on e.g. OECD 
countries (Stegarescu, 2004) or some countries 
from America or Africa (Panizza, 1999; Martinez-
Vazquez & Canavire-Bacarreza, 2012) values of 
these indicators might vary.
3. Results and Discussion
3.1 Cluster Creation and 
Characteristics
Different measures of fi scal decentralization 
mentioned in chapter 2 serve as input to the 
cluster analysis. EU countries were clustered 
according to fi scal decentralization average 
values. Scaling them and computing the 
distance matrix in R the fi nal division is obtained. 
The average degree of fi scal decentralization 
according to ExpDec, RevDec and GrantDec was 
computed for 1995-2015, TaxDec 1995-2014. 
Malta´s TaxDec was set as proxy 0, studying 
the tax assignment in Malta. Croatia´s ExpDec, 
RevDec and GrantDec averages are for 2001-
2015, and TaxDec for 2002-2014 according 
to available data. Fiscal decentralization 
averages of EU countries according to 
different measure are displayed in Figure 1. 
The predefi ned scale divides EU countries in 
a following mode: 1 (the lightest shadow of 
grey) characterizes countries from 0% to 10% 
fi scal decentralization, 2 characterizes 11-20%, 
3 characterizes 21-30%, 4 characterizes 
31-40% and 5 characterizes 41 and more % 
fi scal decentralization degree.
Optimal number of clusters relies on 
author opinion with regards on the binary 
tree dendrogram (see Fig. 2). The optimum 
set by authors is three clusters. According to 
the clusters´ summary data, clusters in the 
dendrogram are located as following. From the 
left to the right side the fi rst is situated cluster 
2, then cluster 3 and cluster 1. It is necessary 
to notice the structure of the cluster 1, where 
three countries (Malta, Greece and Cyprus) 
are involved despite creating an isolated sub-
cluster. In these three countries, the rate of 
fi scal decentralization is extremely low. In the 
next step of the research (panel estimation) are 
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these countries excluded from the investigating.
Cluster 1 includes twelve EU countries. The 
body of the cluster is created by nine countries 
(excluding Malta, Greece and Cyprus). It 
contains two federal countries Belgium and 
Germany. In Spain the importance of regions is 
enhanced by the central government and they 
are provided by high autonomy (Stegarescu, 
2004; Provazníková, 2015; Panizza, 1999). 
The importance of stronger and autonomous 
regions and municipalities also embodies in 
public support of the private sector provided 
by regional governments. It consists in creating 
better conditions that help to modernize the 
regional economy and to retain local sources 
as mentions Džupka et al. (2016, p. 54). Local 
resources are important also for the ability 
to attract investments (Martí et al., 2017). 
According to Afonso and Hauptmeier (2009, 
p. 6), Germany and Spain are characterized 
by pronounced fi scal federalism. In Germany, 
there is a vertical and horizontal system of 
revenue distribution (Hybka, 2016). France 
is decentralized territorially. Despite there is 
Fig. 1: Fiscal decentralization averages
Source: own computation
Note: Malta and Cyprus are not displayed on the map, Malta due to small dimension, Cyprus due to map trim.
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a three-level local self-governance (regions, 
departments and municipalities), this country 
is rather centralized (Shah, 2007). Slovakia 
has established regional levels of government, 
contrary to countries as Bulgaria, Luxembourg, 
Portugal and Slovenia with self-governments 
only on municipal level. In comparison with 
other clusters, in cluster 1, values of ExpDec 
and RevDec are rather low. Values of TaxDec 
and GrantDec are higher. Malta, Greece and 
Cyprus are in the earlier step of hierarchical 
clustering classifi ed to this cluster according to 
low expenditure and revenue decentralization 
and high-grant decentralization average 
values. The appearance of some countries (e.g. 
Germany or Slovakia) relies on the intensive 
inter-governmental grant fl ows.
Cluster 2 includes eight unitary EU countries. 
Most of them have multi-tiered local government 
(excluding Latvia which revised the resident 
structure of the country and established one-tier 
municipal government and republican cities with 
autonomous council according to Administrative 
territorial reform in 2009, Balodis et al., 2013). 
Finland and Sweden have certain regions 
established on experimental base (Provazníková, 
2015) to test the decentralization eligibility. Italy 
has three-level local governance. The important 
role of regions (Provazníková, 2015; Panizza, 
1999) is similarly to Spain in cluster 1. Cluster 2 
differs from cluster 1 according to much higher 
ExpDec and RevDec average values. Values of 
the TaxDec indicator are rather high. Values of 
the GrantDec indicator are low.
In cluster 3, corresponding EU countries are 
unitary with exception of Austria (federation). 
However, Austria has two-tiered sub-national 
government as the prevalent part of the cluster 
Fig. 2: Cluster Dendrogram
Source: own computation
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countries. Estonia, Ireland and Lithuania have 
one-tier local government. In Lithuania and 
Ireland, the establishment of the regional self-
government was planned, although Ireland 
dropped this process. Estonia passed the 
administrative reform in 2016-2017 in aim 
to reduce the number of local elected bodies 
(Statistics Estonia, 2017). Average values of 
ExpDec and RevDec indicators of the cluster 3 
are in the middle, in comparison with cluster 1 
they are higher, but in comparison with cluster 2 
they are lower (but closer to those of cluster 2). 
Average values of TaxDec indicator are low and 
values of GrantDec are also in the middle of the 
value range.
According to the clusters´ composition, 
the structure of the public administration of the 
countries (number of sub-national levels of 
governments) differs inside the cluster. Cluster 
membership and corresponding average values 
of fi scal decentralization different measures 
indicate the different intensity of the fi scal 
decentralization. The results show that in some 
cases more administratively decentralized 
countries (with more than one level of local 
government) have lower share of sub-national 
expenditure or revenue on total government 
expenditure or revenue in comparison with one-
tier local government. E.g. in 2011 Hungary´s 
regions and municipalities were dropped from 
some important responsibilities in favour of 
the central government. French regions and 
departments lost certain fi scal responsibilities in 
2010 (Provazníková, 2015). Stegarescu (2004) 
discusses the high linguistic fragmentation in 
Belgium or Spain which led to the transfer of 
fi scal competencies and powers to regions and 
communities what supports quite high average 
TaxDec, despite low ExpDec and RevDec. 
Similarly to Stegarescu (2004), studies of Panizza 
(1999) or Martinez-Vazquez and Canavire-
Bacarreza (2012) regard the indicator of ethnic 
fractionalization as important in the process of 
fi scal decentralization. The country sample of 
these two studies exceeds the EU countries 
sample. Panizza (1999, p. 10) mentions some 
of ethnic fractionalization index values. From 
European countries the highest degree of ethnic 
fractionalization is in Belgium (0.55), Switzerland 
(0.5). Yugoslavia was the European country 
with the highest degree of fractionalization 
(0.75). Currently, the prevalent part of former 
Yugoslavia countries is not an EU member, and 
also Switzerland is not an EU member.
3.2 Panel Estimations
For each cluster, four models are estimated 
according to the type of the fi scal decentralization 
measurement. Final estimations contain only 
statistically signifi cant variables.
Results of cluster 1 estimations present 
statistically signifi cant occurrence of the 
dependency ratio variable in all cases. Its 
negative relation to fi scal decentralization is 
observed in the ExpDec and RevDec model (see 
Tab. 2, column 2 and 3) matching the results 
of Stegarescu (2004), while his assumptions 
were different. In this group of countries, the 
adjustment of the division of public fi nance 
functions and public fi nance in a multi-order 
government is sensitive on the evolution of 
the share of the economic inactive population 
on total population. If the dependency 
ratio increases, the degree of expenditure 
and revenue decentralization decreases. 
Oppositely, Stegarescu (2004, p. 20) expected, 
that if the revenue from income taxes and social 
contribution decreases, it declines the central 
government revenue and ceteris paribus 
increases the degree of fi scal decentralization. 
The negative impact of the dependency ratio 
increase on fi scal decentralization might be 
caused by the higher reduction of certain 
local taxes connected to economic situation 
(in comparison with the reduction of central 
government revenue) in the most developed 
and core EU countries involved to this cluster. 
In Belgium these local taxes are additional 
income tax, in Germany, it is trading tax, in 
France, it is a local trading tax and municipal tax 
on income (Široký, 2009). Results obtained in 
case of TaxDec and GrantDec models might be 
explained by the sub-national revenue oriented 
fi scal decentralization indicators. The decrease 
of central government revenue in the period of 
decreased dependency ratio might cause cuts in 
transfers to subnational governments including 
revenues from shared tax. This diminishes the 
sub-national total revenue and thus increases 
the degree of fi scal decentralization.
Positive relation of population density 
on fi scal decentralization rate is observed 
in all cases. To support obtained results an 
argument is found in the available literature. 
According to Jílek (2015) larger countries 
decentralize more (considering the population 
as the country size measure). The increase of 
the population induces higher heterogeneity 
of preferences what desires a movement 
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toward decentralization (Panizza, 1999). It is 
noticeable, that demographic variables are 
signifi cant in a cluster, which contains the most 
populous EU countries (Germany, France, 
Spain, Belgium).
Observed negative sign of the openness 
variable coeffi cient in the ExpDec and TaxDec 
model matches the expectations and fi ndings 
of Bodman et al. (2009). In cluster 1, countries 
as Belgium, Bulgaria, Luxembourg (extreme), 
Slovenia and Slovakia have high values of 
Cluster 1 ExpDec modelFEM
RevDec model
REM
TaxDec model
FEM
GrantDec model
REM
variable Coeff. Signif. Coeff. Signif. Coeff. Signif. Coeff. Signif.
intercept  0.1578 ***  0.2411 *** -0.5980 *  0.0636
dependencyratio -0.0023 ** -0.0022 ***  0.0162 ***  0.0061 **
opennessGDP -0.0003 *** -0.0016 ***
popdensity  0.0002 *  0.0001 ***  0.0024 *  0.0003 ***
LocDebtGDP  0.0034 **  0.0098 *** -0.0300 *** -0.0190 **
PubDebtGDP  0.0012 **  0.0001 ***
adjR2 0.29 0.30 0.44 0.46
Cluster 2 ExpDec modelREM
RevDec model
REM
TaxDec model
REM
GrantDec model
REM
variable Coeff. Signif. Coeff. Signif. Coeff. Signif. Coeff. Signif.
intercept  0.3385 ***  0.3495 ***  0.3578 *** 0.6241 ***
opennessGDP  0.0002 ** -0.0003 *  0.0008 **
PubDebtGDP -0.0008 *** -0.0004 **  0.0018 ***
GDPpcgrowth -0.0003 * -0.0005 *  0.0009 *  0.0010 **
LocDebtGDP  0.0081 ***  0.0152 *** -0.0199 ***  0.0106 ***
infl HICP  0.0022 ***  0.0021 **
dependencyratio -0.0093 ***
adjR2 0.47 0.47 0.36 0.21
Cluster 3 ExpDec modelREM
RevDec model
REM
TaxDec model
REM
GrantDec model
REM
variable Coeff. Signif. Coeff. Signif. Coeff. Signif. Coeff. Signif.
intercept  0.3624 ***  0.3196 ***  0.1231 ***  0.1315 ***
opennessGDP -0.0004 * -0.0003 *  0.0013 ***
PubDebtGDP -0.0015 *** -0.0012 ***  0.0010 *** -0.0113 ***
GDPpcgrowth  0.0012 *  0.0012 *
infl HICP -0.0013 *** -0.0011 ***  0.0036 ***  0.0008 **
LocDebtGDP  0.0116 *** -0.0134 *** -0.0090 *
adjR2 0.33 0.30 0.47 0.39
Source: own computation
*** denotes signifi cance at 0.01, ** at 0.05 and * at 0.1 signifi cance level.
Tab. 2: Cluster 1, 2 and 3 estimations
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openness (1995-2015 average openness of 
Belgium is 143% of GDP, Bulgaria 102% of 
GDP, Luxembourg 295% of GDP, Slovenia 
118% of GDP and Slovakia 143% of GDP). 
Taxes from international trade (export and 
import taxes) are mostly the central government 
revenue, what decreases the value of the fi scal 
decentralization indicator.
The relation of local debt to fi scal de-
centralization rate is positive in case of ExpDec 
and RevDec model. Taking and local use of 
returnable fi nancial resources to fi nance local 
needs lead to increase of local revenue and 
local expenditure, what increases the degree 
of fi scal decentralization. In case of TaxDec 
and GrantDec models is the situation opposite. 
The local revenue from loans increases the 
sub-national total revenue, what decreases the 
degree of fi scal decentralization formally.
Public debt variable is signifi cant only in 
TaxDec and GrantDec models. Its positive 
relation to fi scal decentralization rate might 
be caused by a situation, when public debt 
(prevalently created on the central level) 
exhausts the public budget, requires saving 
arrangements, what reduces the amount 
of transfers shifted to sub-national level. 
This decreases sub-national total revenue 
and increases formally the degree of fi scal 
decentralization. E.g. in many of cluster 
countries (Belgium, Spain, France, Portugal, 
Slovenia or Germany) currently the public debt 
exceeds the Maastricht criterion, and since 
the fi nancial crisis, transfers received by sub-
national governments decreased.
Results of cluster 2 estimations reveal 
some additional factors determining the fi scal 
decentralization in related countries. Here, in 
comparison with estimations for cluster 1, the 
signifi cant appearance of the GDP per capita 
growth variable and infl ation rate variable is 
present. In the case of the GDP per capita 
growth variable, the ExpDec and RevDec 
models results follow the basics of the Wagner´s 
Law. The increase of GDP per capita growth 
increases the public expenditure in developed 
countries. In post-communist countries involved 
to the cluster (Czech Republic, Poland, Latvia 
and Croatia as a member of former Yugoslavia), 
additional sources served to fi nance capital 
investments or other reforms made by central 
government level. Thus the increase of GDP 
per capita growth induces decrease of the fi scal 
decentralization rate. Results of the TaxDec and 
GrantDec models reveal the formal tendency to 
more decentralization with respect of fi nance 
concentrated in the central budget in expense of 
shifting them to sub-national budgets, reducing 
the sub-national total revenues.
In the case of cluster 2 countries, the 
openness variable behaves contrary to 
expectation. It might be caused by the lower level 
of openness in these countries. In comparison 
with cluster 1, where Luxembourg is opened 
to 295% of GDP (1995-2015 average), Italy as 
one of the most developed countries in cluster 
2, reaches the average of 50% of GDP, Poland 
71% of GDP, Finland 73% of GDP or Sweden 
81% of GDP.
The mismatch with expectations is obtained 
in case of the infl ation rate, where results show 
positive relation between infl ation rate and 
expenditure and revenue decentralization. The 
explanation might be found in a theoretically 
oriented literature by the uncoordinated 
government activity, when in the period of 
increasing infl ation rate, the government 
transfers responsibilities to sub-national level, 
even if the sub-national government level is 
not able to contribute to stabilization of the 
economy (Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 2005; Jha, 
2015). In monitored period, the fi nancial crisis 
disturbed the economic development of many 
countries which faced the public sector reforms. 
In 2007-2008, the infl ation rate increased in all 
cluster countries. In the Czech Republic, the 
infl ation rate doubled, and the expenditure and 
revenue decentralization increased stably from 
1999 to 2008 (Jílek, 2009).
Public debt´s impact on expenditure 
and revenue decentralization is negative in 
accordance with theoretical assumptions. The 
dramatic increase of public debt is obvious 
almost in all cluster countries after the fi nancial 
crisis except of Latvia, Poland and Sweden, while 
the expenditure and revenue decentralization 
indicators diminished moderately or stagnated 
in this period (except of Sweden, where these 
indicators increased continually). 
Local debt´s relation to fi scal 
decentralization is positive in the ExpDec, 
RevDec and GrantDec models. Here again, 
the option of using returnable fi nancial 
resources by sub-national governments might 
mirror in both local budget sides. Firstly, it 
appears in the revenue side of sub-national 
budgets as received loans. Correspondingly 
it appears in the expenditure side as capital 
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expenditure and consequently principal and 
interest payments.
Dependency ratio is statistically signifi cant 
once, in the GrantDec model, and its relation 
to fi scal decentralization is negative. It is 
notable that in all cluster countries the share 
of economically inactive population on total 
population is increasing. This invokes pressure 
on central governments redistributive activities 
fi nanced from central budget in expense of sub-
national needs.
Results of cluster 3 estimations show 
negative effect of openness variable on fi scal 
decentralization in the case of ExpDec and 
RevDec models. Similarly to cluster 1, in 
countries as Estonia, Lithuania, Ireland and 
Netherlands openness values increased during 
the monitored period and in 2015 reached 
levels over 150% of GDP, Ireland even 216% 
of GDP. As is mentioned hereinbefore, export 
and import taxes are revenue of central 
government, what decreases the value of the 
fi scal decentralization indicator.
The increase of GDP per capita growth 
induces increase of the fi scal decentralization 
rate in the case of TaxDec and GrantDec 
models. Similarly to results of cluster 2, 
possible reduction of sub-national total revenue 
due to realizing investment activities on central 
government level, might formally increase 
a fi scal decentralization degree. The need of 
building up the infrastructure (e.g. highways) 
was satisfi ed in post-communist economies as 
Hungary or Romania. In Estonia, massive public 
sector reforms were realized. In Lithuania, the 
program of restrictive reforms was implemented 
in 2008 after the fi nancial crisis. (Ministry of 
Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak 
Republic, 2017)
Relation between public debt and fi scal 
decentralization is negative supporting the 
expectation in case of ExpDec and RevDec 
models. Unclear rests the explanation of its 
signifi cant appearance in the TaxDec and 
GrantDec models, where surprisingly the 
coeffi cient signs differ in these two cases. 
The result for the GrantDec model might be 
explained by the decreased amount of grants 
shifted to the sub-national government level in 
period of public debt increase. 
For this group of countries, the infl ation 
rate variable behaves in accord with 
expectations about its negative relation to 
fi scal decentralization. The increase of infl ation 
rate infl uences the decrease of degree of 
expenditure and revenue decentralization. As 
mention Siničáková and Gavurová (2017), raise 
of infl ation worsens the economic condition 
in a country. Following the idea of Musgrave 
(1959) revived e.g. by Oates (2005), centrally 
provided stabilization of the economy is desired 
in expense of further fi scal decentralization. 
Positive nature of the relation in the question in 
the case of TaxDec and GrantDec model might 
be caused by the decline of sub-national total 
revenue in the time of realizing stabilization 
arrangements on central level.
Local debt´s relation to fi scal decentralization 
is positive in the RevDec model, but negative 
in the TaxDec and GrantDec model. This effect 
might be caused by the central regulation of local 
indebtedness. In Hungary, local governments 
suffered from inadequate shift of responsibilities 
and resources. It led to excessive indebtedness 
on municipal level. This encouraged the central 
government to withdraw certain part of their 
responsibilities and autonomy, what decreased 
the fi scal decentralization (Reuters, 2012).
3.3 Discussion
Main fi ndings of the cluster analysis point to 
the different level of fi scal decentralization 
in countries with comparable government 
constitution what results in assignment of both 
unitary and federal states into a common cluster. 
It means that not all federations are equally 
decentralized and similar is the situation in case 
of one or/and multi-government unitary states. 
This is the principal reason for clustering the EU 
countries according to fi scal decentralization 
indicators. Regarding the promotion of the 
fi scal decentralization economic benefi ts in 
the literature, its implementation is evaluated 
as a positive move. Unfortunately, the theory 
does not give a recommendation or a guide 
about its optimal rate or degree. As the panel 
estimation results show, different political 
and socio-economic conditions in monitored 
countries necessitate a unique approach to 
realizing this process respecting the countries´ 
particularity. For different clusters, the relation of 
investigated variables to fi scal decentralization 
varies and thus different factors are determining 
the fi scal decentralization. Results also show 
a need of concrete fi scal decentralization 
indicator revision. Prevalent part of results 
indicates contradictory relate of explanatory 
variables to basic but formal ExpDec and 
EM_2_2018.indd   166 22.6.2018   9:17:35
1672, XXI, 2018
Finance
RevDec indicator in comparison with TaxDec 
and GrantDec indicator. In case of GrantDec 
fi scal decentralization indicator, it is obvious 
that the increase of grant fl ow intensity from 
the central government level has a reductive 
effect on the fi scal decentralization rate if 
considering the autonomous decision-making 
processes made at sub-national government 
level. The basic essence of this indicator 
expresses the dependency of lower levels of 
government on the central level. In the case of 
TaxDec, the question resists in the composition 
of sub-national tax revenues with accent on 
own tax revenues. If it is low, the shared tax 
revenues predominate, and these quasi-grants 
causes, that the TaxDec indicator behaves 
as GrantDec. Despite of mentioned, there 
are some common tendencies comparing the 
fi scal decentralization determinants for different 
clusters. Signifi cant is presence of public and 
local debt variable, GDP per capita growth, 
openness and infl ation rate, dependency ratio 
or population density variable.
Assumptions about variables´ signifi cance 
and their positive or negative impact on fi scal 
decentralization rate are not confi rmed fully. 
Partial satisfaction is caused by several 
facts. Clusters are created on basis of fi scal 
decentralization indicator averages, but from 
the point of economic characterization of 
countries in the question, there can be abysmal 
differences. This embarrasses the panel 
estimation. Additionally, some models have 
to deal with low R2 (e.g. GrantDec estimation 
for cluster 2). Undeniable is the role of the 
fi scal decentralization indicator expression. 
However, Horváthová et al. (2012), Stegarescu 
(2004), Blume and Voigt (2008) or Bodman 
et al. (2009) stresses the formality of fi scal 
decentralization indicators. As ExpDec and 
RevDec are regarded only as formal indicators 
and TaxDec and GrantDec stricter and more 
precise, results of estimations are different. The 
suggestion in this fi eld provided by Stegarescu 
(2004) is related to the use of indicators which 
involve sub-national own revenues (especially 
own taxes, where locality controls the tax 
base and tax rate). This approach requires 
data rarely published in most of databases 
including the Eurostat, OECD or World Bank 
database. It is obvious that the construction of 
fi scal decentralization indicators is mirrored in 
observed results (see Tab. 2).
Conclusions
Identifi cation of the fi scal decentralization 
determinants is provided in several steps. 
First, the fi scal decentralization rate in the EU 
countries is measured by different measures 
as expenditure, revenue, tax, and grant 
decentralization. Then their averages are 
computed to serve as input data to the cluster 
analysis. Classifi cation of the EU countries 
into clusters makes groups of countries 
more homogenous regarding the fi scal 
decentralization different rates. This division 
into three groups is basic information to create 
panels. Accordingly, three different panels are 
set. For each panel four models are estimated 
to refer on the fi scal decentralization different 
measurement types. Results of estimation are 
confronted to assumptions based on related 
literature.
Identifi ed determinants of the fi scal 
decentralization vary moderately according 
to cluster membership. Results of estimation 
revealed the dependence on construction of 
the fi scal decentralization measure. However, 
basic collision consists in the construction 
of expenditure and revenue decentralization 
measure in comparison with the tax and grant 
decentralization measure. While expenditure 
and revenue decentralization compares 
sub-national expenditure or revenue to total 
government expenditure or revenue, tax and 
grant decentralization are based on the share 
of a correspondent sub-item on sub-national 
total revenue. Though, this share is indirectly 
dependent on the central government decisions.
Results of the cluster 1 estimations present 
statistically signifi cant relation between fi scal 
decentralization and dependency ratio, 
population density, openness, public and 
local debt. In cluster 2 it is the openness, 
GDP per capita growth, infl ation rate, public 
and local debt and dependency ratio. Finally, 
cluster 3 estimations point to statistically 
signifi cant impact of openness, GDP per 
capita growth, infl ation rate and public and 
local debt on fi scal decentralization rate. 
Certain empirical regularities are observable. 
The openness variable has negative effect 
on fi scal decentralization degree in clusters, 
which include countries with high values of this 
variable. The growth of the GDP per capita is 
signifi cant in clusters with half of membership 
created from post-communist countries. It is in 
negative relation with expenditure and revenue 
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decentralization, contrary to positive effect in 
case of tax and grant decentralization. Impact 
of infl ation rate on fi scal decentralization differs 
in clusters, but is positive in cluster, where all 
involved countries had to faced its increase in 
the time of fi nancial crisis. Observed signifi cant 
effect of demographic variables (dependency 
ratio and population density) mostly appears 
in cluster, which include the most populous 
EU countries. Public debt infl uences the 
expenditure and revenue decentralization 
negatively following the need of centrally 
provided stabilization, while in case of tax and 
grant decentralization is its effect positive due 
to the sub-national total revenue decline. Local 
debt is in prevalent parts in positive relationship 
with expenditure and revenue decentralization, 
when returnable fi nancial resources increase 
sub-national revenue and correspondingly its 
expenditure, contrary to this effect in case of 
tax and grant decentralization.
The sensitivity of the estimation results 
on the fi scal decentralization measurement is 
obvious. Different measures lead to disunited 
results inside the cluster. Panels for clusters are 
sensitive also for their content. Involving all EU 
countries in one panel will probably bring similar 
results of unclear or contradictory nature. For 
the further research in this fi eld, the extension 
of the cluster analysis input data is admissible. 
Naturally, fi nal results will differ following the 
different division of countries into clusters.
The paper is published within project VEGA 
1/0559/16.
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Abstract
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION DETERMINANTS: ANALYSIS 
OF THE EU COUNTRIES´ CLUSTERED SAMPLE IN PERIOD 1995-2015
Lenka Maličká, Slavomíra Martinková
Fiscal decentralization as a shift of decision-making powers from the central level of government 
to lower government levels is an object of wide research. In this fi eld there is a discussion ranging 
from the eligibility of fi scal decentralization, its advantages and threats, to searching for the fi scal 
decentralization´s impact on certain macroeconomic indicators. Research focusing on investigating 
for fi scal decentralization determinants has not clear answer to this question. It considers various 
indicators often with their ambiguous impact on fi scal decentralization. In this paper, the problem 
of fi scal decentralization determinants is investigated on the EU countries sample in period 1995-
2015. EU countries are divided into groups according to their fi scal decentralization average degree 
using the cluster analysis. Fiscal decentralization different measures refer on the expenditure, 
revenue, tax and grant decentralization. For each cluster a panel model is estimated to reveal an 
infl uence of selected variables on fi scal decentralization, while fi scal decentralization as dependent 
variable is measured by chosen various measure. Sensitivity of the estimation results on the fi scal 
decentralization measurement is obvious. Obtained results partially support assumptions given on 
basics of related literature. Signifi cant appearance of the economy openness variable, GDP per 
capita growth and infl ation rate, public and local debt variable and variable based on dependency 
ratio, and population density is infl uenced by construction of the fi scal decentralization indicator. 
It might explain the disunited character of observed FEM and REM results, additionally the turn of 
coeffi cient sign comparing fi scal decentralization measures postulates certain common tendencies 
revealing the fi scal decentralization character and conditions.
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